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18 CV 11280

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SKYROCKET, LLC d/b/a SKYROCKET TOYS
LLC,

Plaintiff

v.

SATOY STORE, B2B_BABY, COOLTOY
STORE, CORDAZLE TOY STORE STORE,
DOUBLED, DROPSHIP PROFESSIONAL
SERVICE STORE, DZ_JEWELRY A/K/A DZ-
TOYS AND GAMES ONLINE STORE,
EDENKING, EKINCHAN, GOOD SISDER
STORE, HIZOECHU TOY STORE,
JAYSUING, JIANGYUANZE, JINKEDA688,
JOCESTYLE GLOBAL DIRECT STORE,
JTOY, KIDS_DRESS, KIDS_SHOW,
LENOVA, LIANGJINGJING_KITCHE,
LIANGJINGJING_NO1,
LIANGJINGJING_NO3,
LIANGJINGJING_WATCH, LIGHTCRACK,
LJ FUN STORE, LOLSURPRISE OFICIAL
STORE, LOYUDAY STORE, MANDYE
STORE, MICSELLCOM, MVP999 STORE,
NINGBO JINGFENG INTERNATIONAL
TRADE CO., LTD., OUMEIDA TOY STORE,

CIVIL ACTION No.

**MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 1) *EX
PARTE* APPLICATION FOR A
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER; 2) ORDER RESTRAINING
ASSETS AND MERCHANT
STOREFRONTS; 3) AN ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE WHY A
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
SHOULD NOT ISSUE; 4) ORDER
AUTHORIZING BIFURCATED
AND ALTERNATIVE SERVICE
AND 5) ORDER AUTHORIZING
EXPEDITED DISCOVERY**

FILED UNDER SEAL

SHENZHEN HONGJIAXIN PLASTIC
PRODUCTS CO., LTD., SHENZHEN
LONGESEN TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD.,
SHENZHEN XINQI TECHNOLOGY CO.,
LTD., SHINE FOR YOU STORE,
SHOP2945021 STORE, SHOP2951139 STORE,
SHOP3661063 STORE, SHOP3680088 STORE,
SWEET_CARGO, TOP_TOY, TOYGUYS,
TRITRUT, YANGZHOU DU LALA CRAFTS
CO., LTD., YANGZHOU HOME KA CRAFTS
LTD., YIWU CITY TRENDZ ACCESSORIES
CO., LTD., YIWU DEMI ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE CO., LTD., YIWU HAO YI
PAPER PRODUCTS FIRM and YIWU TOP
TOY FACTORY,

Defendants

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GLOSSERY

<u>Term</u>	<u>Definition</u>
Plaintiff or “Skyrocket”	Skyrocket, LLC d/b/a Skyrocket Toys LLC
Defendants	5ATOY Store, b2b_baby, CoolToy Store, cordazle toy store Store, doubled, Dropship Professional Service Store, Dz_jewelry a/k/a DZ-Toys and Games online store, edenking, ekinchan, GOOD SISDER Store, HizoeChu Toy Store, jaysuing, jiangyuanze, jinkeda688, JOCESTYLE Global Direct Store, jtoy, kids_dress, kids_show, lenova, liangjingjing_kitche, liangjingjing_no1, liangjingjing_no3, liangjingjing_watch, lightcrack, Lj Fun Store, lolSurprise official Store, Loyuday Store, Mandye Store, micsellcom, MVP999 Store, Ningbo Jingfeng International Trade Co., Ltd., OuMeiDa Toy Store, Shenzhen Hongjiaxin Plastic Products Co., Ltd., Shenzhen Longesen Technology Co., Ltd., Shenzhen Xinqi Technology Co., Ltd., Shine For You Store, Shop2945021 Store, Shop2951139 Store, Shop3661063 Store, Shop3680088 Store, sweet_cargo, top_toy, toyguys, tritrut, Yangzhou Du Lala Crafts Co., Ltd., Yangzhou Home Ka Crafts Ltd., Yiwu City Trendz Accessories Co., Ltd., Yiwu Demi Electronic Commerce Co., Ltd., Yiwu Hao Yi Paper Products Firm and YIWU TOP TOY FACTORY
Complaint	Plaintiff’s Complaint filed on December 4, 2018
Application	Plaintiff’s <i>Ex Parte</i> Application for: 1) a temporary restraining order; 2) an order restraining assets and Merchant Storefronts (as defined <i>infra</i>); 3) an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue; 4) an order authorizing bifurcated and alternative service and 5) an order authorizing expedited discovery filed on December 4, 2018
Arnaiz Dec.	Declaration of Jessica Arnaiz in Support of Plaintiff’s Application
Ardell Dec.	Declaration of John Ardell in Support of Plaintiff’s Application
Scully Dec.	Declaration of Brienne Scully in Support of Plaintiff’s Application
Pomsies Mark	U.S. Trademark Registration No. 5,572,184 for “POMSIES” for a variety of goods in Class 28
Pomsies Works	U.S. Copyright Registration No. VA 2-127-288, covering the Pomsies Cat, U.S. Copyright Registration No. VA 2-127-368, covering the Pomsies Dog, U.S. Copyright Registration No. VA 2-127-287, covering the Pomsies Dragon, U.S. Copyright Registration No. VA 2-127-381, covering the Pomsies Koala, U.S. Copyright Registration No. VA 2-127-371, covering the Pomsies Unicorn and U.S. Copyright Registration No. VA 2-127-295, covering the Pomsies Packaging

Counterfeit Products or Infringing Products	Products bearing or used in connection with the Pomsies Mark and/or Pomsies Works, and/or products in packaging and/or containing labels bearing the Pomsies Mark and/or Pomsies Works, and/or bearing or used in connection with marks and/or artwork that are confusingly or substantially similar to the Pomsies Mark and/or Pomsies Works and/or products that are identical or confusingly or substantially similar to the Pomsies Products
User Accounts	Any and all websites, any and all accounts with online marketplace platforms such as Alibaba.com, AliExpress.com and DHgate.com, as well as any and all as yet undiscovered accounts with additional online marketplace platforms held by or associated with Defendants, their respective officers, employees, agents, servants and all other persons in active concert with any of them
Merchant Storefronts	Any and all User Accounts through which Defendants, their respective officers, employees, agents, servants and all persons in active concert or participation with any of them operate storefronts to manufacture, import, export, advertise, market, promote, distribute, display, offer for sale, sell and/or otherwise deal in products, including Counterfeit Products, which are held by or associated with Defendants, their respective officers, employees, agents, servants and all persons in active concert or participation with any of them
Defendants' Assets	All money, securities or other property or assets of Defendants (whether said assets are located in the U.S. or abroad)
Defendants' Financial Accounts	Financial accounts associated with or utilized by any Defendants or any Defendants' User Accounts or Merchant Storefront(s) (whether said account is located in the U.S. or abroad)
Financial Institutions	Any banks, financial institutions, credit card companies and payment processing agencies, such as PayPal Inc. ("PayPal"), Payoneer Inc. ("Payoneer"), the Alibaba Group d/b/a Alibaba.com and Aliexpress.com ("Alibaba") payment services (e.g., Alipay.com Co., Ltd., Ant Financial Services Group), Dunhuang Group d/b/a DHgate.com ("DHgate") (e.g., DHpay.com), PingPong Global Solutions, Inc. ("PingPong"), and other companies or agencies that engage in the processing or transfer of money and/or real or personal property of Defendants
Third Party Service Providers	Online marketplace platforms, including, without limitation, those owned and operated, directly or indirectly by Alibaba.com or AliExpress.com, as well as any and all as yet undiscovered online marketplace platforms and/or entities through which Defendants, their respective officers, employees, agents, servants and all persons in active concert or participation with any of them manufacture, import, export, advertise, market, promote, distribute, offer for sale, sell and/or otherwise deal in

	Counterfeit Products which are hereinafter identified as a result of any order entered in this action, or otherwise
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I. INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to and in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff submits this memorandum of law in support of its *ex parte* Application in light of Defendants' intentional and willful offering for sale and/or sales of Counterfeit Products. Courts often grant *ex parte* applications for relief in similar matters¹ and Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant this Application.

Alibaba.com, AliExpress.com and DHgate.com are online marketplace platforms which allow manufacturers, wholesalers and other third-party merchants, like Defendants, to advertise, offer for sale, sell, distribute and ship their wholesale and retail products originating from China directly to consumers across the world and specifically to consumers residing in the U.S., including New York. *See* Scully Dec., ¶ 3. Defendants are individuals and/or businesses, who, upon information and belief, are located in China but conduct business in the U.S. and other countries by means of their respective User Accounts and Merchant Storefronts on the Third Party Service Providers. *See* Arnaiz Dec., ¶¶ 4, 6, Ardell Dec., ¶¶ 24-25 and Scully Dec., ¶ 3. Through their Merchant Storefronts, Defendants offer for sale and/or sell consumer products, including Counterfeit Products, and market, distribute and ship such products to consumers throughout the world, including New York. *See* Arnaiz Dec., ¶¶ 6-7, 10-11, Ex. A; Ardell Dec., ¶ 25 and Scully Dec., ¶ 3. Third-party merchants, like Defendants, often use evasive tactics like aliases, false addresses and other incomplete identification information to conceal their identities and avoid

¹ *See In re Vuitton et Fils, S.A.*, 606 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that *ex parte* temporary restraining orders are indispensable to the commencement of an action when they are the sole method of preserving a state of affairs in which the court can provide effective final relief); *see also, e.g., JLM Couture, Inc. v. Aimibridal, et al.*, No. 18-cv-1565-JMF, Dkt. 18 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2018); *Ideavillage Products Corp. v. Dongguan Opete Yoga Wear Manufacturer Co., Ltd., et al.*, No. 17-cv-9099 (JMF), Dkt. 19 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2017); *Gucci America, Inc., et al v. Alibaba Group Holding LTD, et al*, No. 1:15-cv-03784 (PKC) (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2015); *AW Licensing, LLC v. Bao*, No. 15- CV-1373, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177101, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2015); *Klipsch Grp., Inc. v. Big Box Store Ltd.*, No. 1:12-cv-06283 (VSB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153137, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2012).

detection. *See* Scully Dec., ¶¶ 12, 13. In fact, Defendants' User Accounts and Merchant Storefronts are either devoid of any or contain incomplete information regarding Defendants' true identities, locations and contact information, making it virtually impossible for Plaintiff to obtain independently. *See id.*, ¶¶ 22-23.

Without Plaintiff's authorization or consent, Defendants were and/or currently are manufacturing, importing, exporting, advertising, marketing, promoting, distributing, displaying, offering for sale and/or selling Counterfeit Products to consumers located in the U.S., including New York, through their Merchant Storefronts. *See* Arnaiz Dec., ¶¶ 4-6, Ex. A; Ardell Dec., ¶¶ 24-26 and Scully Dec., ¶¶ 15-18, Ex. A. Defendants' aforementioned actions have caused and will continue to cause – should the requested relief be denied – irreparable harm to Plaintiff's goodwill and reputation as well as to unassuming consumers who will continue to wrongly believe that Defendants' inferior Counterfeit Products are authorized, sponsored, approved, endorsed and/or licensed by Plaintiff when, in fact, they are not. *See* Ardell Dec., ¶¶ 28-29.

Plaintiff's request for *ex parte* relief is particularly necessary because if Defendants receive notice of this Lawsuit, it is highly likely that they will transfer, conceal and/or destroy 1) the Counterfeit Products, 2) the means of making or obtaining such Counterfeit Products, 3) business records and 4) any and all other evidence relating to their infringing activities. *See* Scully Dec., ¶ 12. Moreover, they will likely hide or dispose of Defendants' Assets. *See id.* In light of the foregoing, and considering that it typically takes noticed Financial Institutions and/or Third Party Service Providers a minimum of five (5) days to locate, attach and freeze Defendants' Assets and/or Defendants' Financial Accounts, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court order bifurcated service specifically allowing enough time for the Financial Institutions and/or Third Party Service Providers to comply with the TRO before ordering service on Defendants.

II. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

The facts are contained in the factual declarations of John Ardell and Jessica Arnaiz and the attorney summarizing declaration of Brienne Scully, plus accompanying exhibits. *See* Ardell Dec., Arnaiz Dec., Scully Dec. and Exhibits A-D to the Complaint. In the interest of brevity, any factual discussion is contained in the legal analysis below.

III. ARGUMENT

A. THIS COURT HAS PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANTS

Determining personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant in a federal question case requires a two-step inquiry. First, courts must look to the law of the forum state to determine whether personal jurisdiction will lie. *See Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank*, 732 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing *Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker*, 490 F.3d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 2007)). Second, if jurisdiction lies, the court then considers whether the district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant comports with due process protections established under the United States Constitution. *See id.*; *see also Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington*, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). As alleged herein, Defendants' unlawful counterfeiting and infringing activities subject them to long-arm jurisdiction in New York under N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 302(a)(1).² Furthermore, New York's exercise of jurisdiction over Defendants thereunder comports with due process.

1. Defendants are Subject to Personal Jurisdiction Under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1)

Under § 302(a)(1), there are two requirements that must be met to establish personal jurisdiction: "(1) [t]he defendant must have transacted business within the state; and (2) the claim asserted must arise from that business activity." *Licci*, 732 F.3d at 168 (quoting *Solé Resort, S.A.*

² Plaintiff respectfully submits that Defendants are also subject to jurisdiction under § 302(a)(3), however, this alternative analysis is omitted for brevity. *See Energy Brands Inc.*, 571 F. Supp. at 470.

de C.V. v. Allure Resorts Mgmt., LLC, 450 F.3d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 2006)). In applying the test for the “transacts business” prong of § 302(a)(1), “New York decisions ... tend to conflate the long-arm statutory and constitutional analyses by focusing on the constitutional standard,” ergo, “a defendant need not be physically present in New York to transact business there within the meaning of [this first prong],” so long as the defendant has engaged in “purposeful activity,” for example, “some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” *Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC*, 616 F.3d 158, 169-71 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting *Best Van Lines, Inc.*, 490 F.3d at 246-247) (internal quotations omitted). The second prong of § 302(a)(1) requires an “articulable nexus or substantial relationship between the business transaction and the claim asserted,” however, “a causal relationship between the business transaction and the claim asserted” is not required. *Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li*, 135 F. Supp. 3d 87, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Rather, it is sufficient that “the latter is not completely unmoored from the former.” *Id.*

In determining whether a party has “transacted business,” New York courts must look at the totality of the circumstances concerning the party’s interactions with, and activities within, the state. *See Citigroup Inc. v. City Holding Co.*, 97 F. Supp. 2d 549, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is permissible in the context of Internet activity is “directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet.” *Id.* Courts in this Circuit have regularly conferred personal jurisdiction on a given defendant based on that defendant’s operation of a fully interactive website through which consumers can access the site from anywhere and purchase products, as is the case with Defendants’ User Accounts and Merchant Storefronts, and allow for customers all over the world

to communicate with Defendants and view and purchase products, including Counterfeit Products, as demonstrated by the order forms and checkout pages completed by NAL for orders of Counterfeit Products. *See* Arnaiz Dec., ¶¶ 6-15, Ex. A; *see also* *Chloé*, 616 F.3d at 170.

Courts in this Circuit have also exercised jurisdiction over defendants under § 302(a)(1) where such defendants regularly offer for sale and sell goods through online marketplaces, “even though Defendants do not control their [] ‘storefront’ or its interactivity to the same extent that they control their own highly interactive website.” *Lifeguard Licensing Corp. v. Ann Arbor T-Shirt Co., LLC*, No. 15 Civ. 8459 (LGS), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89149 *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2016) (quoting *EnviroCare Techs., LLC v. Simanovsky*, No. 11-CV-3458(JS)(ETB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78088 *8 (E.D.N.Y. June 4, 2012)).³ Jurisdiction is proper “for internet sellers who use an internet storefront like Amazon,” when the Internet sellers are “commercial vendors who use it ‘as a means for establishing regular business with a remote forum.’” *Id.* at *8.

Here, the fact that Defendants elected to open their respective User Accounts for the purpose of selling Counterfeit Products through their Merchant Storefronts alone supports a finding that Defendants have intentionally used Alibaba.com, AliExpress.com or DHgate.com “as a means for establishing regular business with a remote forum.” *EnviroCare Techs., LLC*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78088 at *10 (quoting *Boschetto v. Hansing*, 539 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 2008)). Moreover, the fact that Defendants are offering the Counterfeit Products through their Merchant Storefronts usually in wholesale quantities and always at significantly below-market prices coupled with the fact that most of their User Accounts reflect multiple sales to consumers across the world, including repeat sales to consumers in the U.S., confirms that Defendants are

³ *See also* Footnote 1.

sophisticated sellers operating commercial businesses through Alibaba.com, AliExpress.com or DHgate.com, such that they are subject to jurisdiction. *See id.* at *10.

It is highly likely that Defendants have shipped Counterfeit Products to consumers in New York based on the following: 1) all Defendants provided confirmation to NAL indicating that they ship Counterfeit Products to New York, 2) NAL completed an order form or checkout page for an order of Counterfeit Products from each and every Defendant through an account associated with a New York Address and/or provided a New York Address as the shipping address, 3) NAL received invoices issued by Defendants for the purchase of Counterfeit Products to be delivered to a New York Address, 4) all Defendants accept payment in U.S. dollars and 5) many Defendants have made their own representations regarding their recurrent sales of large quantities of Counterfeit Products to consumers in the U.S., often making up between twenty percent (20%) and fifty percent (50%) of such Defendants' total revenue and generating millions of dollars in revenue. *See Arnaiz Dec.*, ¶¶ 8-18, Ex. A.

Nevertheless, whether a defendant physically shipped Counterfeit Products into New York is not determinative of whether personal jurisdiction exists, as courts in this Circuit examine a given defendant's online interactions with consumers in considering whether a particular defendant has transacted business in the forum state under § 302(a)(1). *See Rolex Watch, U.S.A., Inc. v. Pharel*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32249, at * 6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2011). Plaintiff, Plaintiff's counsel and NAL have viewed Defendants' Counterfeit Products via their online User Accounts and Merchant Storefronts (*see Arnaiz Dec.*, ¶ 7; *Ardell Dec.*, ¶ 22 and *Scully Dec.*, ¶ 17). NAL then communicated with Defendants through their online User Accounts about the Counterfeit Products and the delivery of the Counterfeit Products to a New York Address, received invoices for the purchase of Counterfeit Products to be delivered to a New York Address and completed

order forms or checkout pages for Counterfeit Products by providing a New York Address as the shipping address.⁴ See Arnaiz Dec., ¶¶ 10-13, Ex. A. Thus, Defendants' operation of their sophisticated commercial operations, their offering for sale and/or selling of Counterfeit Products through their highly interactive User Accounts and Merchant Storefronts on Alibaba.com, AliExpress.com or DHgate.com, which generate millions of dollars in illicit revenues from consumers all over the world, including in the U.S., and NAL's completion of order forms and/or checkout pages, along with Defendants' own admissions that they do in fact ship Counterfeit Products to a New York Address, establishes that Defendants conduct business in this judicial district and the claims in this suit arise from Defendants' business dealings and transactions with consumers in New York.⁵ See *id.*, ¶¶ 10-18, Ex. A and Scully Dec., ¶¶ 15-18.

2. Exercising Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendants Comports with Due Process

Asserting personal jurisdiction over Defendants also comports with the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as Defendants have "certain minimum contacts ... such that maintenance of th[is] suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" *Calder v. Jones*, 465 U.S. 783, 788 (1984) (quoting *Milliken v. Meyer*, 311 U.S. 457 (1940)). Defendants intentionally directed activity towards the New York market, thereby purposefully availing themselves of "the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." *Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz*, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (U.S.

⁴ Under case law of the Second Circuit, when analyzing personal jurisdiction in the Internet context, "traditional statutory and constitutional principles remain the touchstone of the inquiry", and while a website's interactivity, "may be useful" for analyzing personal jurisdiction "insofar as it helps to decide whether the defendant 'transacts any business' in New York," ... "it does not amount to a separate framework for analyzing internet-based jurisdiction." *Best Van Lines, Inc.*, 490 F.3d at 252 (quoting *Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker*, No. 03 Civ. 6585 (GEL), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7830, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2004) (internal citation omitted)).

⁵ Plaintiff respectfully submits that the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2), which "provides for jurisdiction over a defendant if a claim arises under federal law, if the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction of any state, and if the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States." *Lechner v. Marco-Domo Internationales Interieur GmbH*, No. 03 Civ. 5664 (JGK), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4022, *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2005).

1985); *see Best Van Lines, Inc.*, 490 F.3d at 243; *see also* Arnaiz Dec., ¶¶ 8-18, Ex. A and Scully Dec., ¶¶ 15-17. Moreover, “as a practical matter, the Due Process Clause permits the exercise of jurisdiction in a broader range of circumstances of N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302, and a foreign defendant meeting the standards of § 302 will satisfy the due process standard.” *Energy Brands Inc.*, 571 F. Supp. 2d at 469. Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully submits that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants in this action.

B. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN *EX PARTE* TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Here, an *ex parte* order is essential to prevent immediate and irreparable injury to Plaintiff. A temporary restraining order may be granted without written or oral notice to the opposing party or that party's counsel where “it clearly appears from the specific facts shown by affidavit . . . that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party or that party's attorney can be heard in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Section 34 of the Lanham Act expressly authorizes this Court to issue *ex parte* restraining orders “with respect to a violation [of the Act] that consists of using a counterfeit mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or distribution of goods.” 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(a).⁶

Once a violation of the Lanham Act is demonstrated, the issuance of an *ex parte* order is appropriate upon showing that: (i) the plaintiff will provide adequate security; (ii) any order other than an *ex parte* order is not adequate to achieve the purposes of 15 U.S.C. § 1114; (iii) the plaintiff has not publicized the requested *ex parte* order; (iv) the plaintiff is likely to succeed on showing that defendants are using counterfeit marks; (v) an immediate and irreparable injury will occur if

⁶ Congress’ purpose for enacting such *ex parte* remedies was to ensure that courts were able to effectively exercise their jurisdiction in counterfeiting cases and to prevent counterfeiters given prior notice from disappearing or quickly disposing of infringing inventory or records relating to their counterfeiting and illegal actions. *See* Senate-House Joint Explanatory Statement on trademark Counterfeiting Legislation, 130 Cong. Rec. H12076, at 12080 (Oct. 10, 1984).

such *ex parte* order is not granted; (vi) the materials to be seized will be located at the place identified in the application; (vii) the harm to the plaintiff in denying the application outweighs the harm to defendants in granting the order and (viii) if prior notice was given, defendants would destroy, move, hide or otherwise make such matter inaccessible to the court. *See* 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(4)(B). As discussed below, Plaintiff meets each of the relevant criteria for the issuance of an *ex parte* temporary restraining order under the Lanham Act.⁷

An *ex parte* temporary restraining order is particularly warranted in cases, such as the instant one, involving offshore counterfeiters who conceal their identities and engage in unlawful and harmful activities over the Internet to avoid revealing their actual locations and identities. *See* Scully Dec., ¶¶ 11-13, 22-23. Defendants, who are located in China and operate their businesses exclusively over the Internet, are knowingly and willfully offering for sale and selling Counterfeit Products through their User Accounts and on their Merchant Storefronts on Alibaba.com, AliExpress.com or DHgate.com. *See* Arnaiz Dec., ¶¶ 4-7, Ex. A; Ardell Dec., ¶ 21 and Scully Dec., ¶ 3. The covert nature of Defendants and their counterfeiting activities make any order other than an *ex parte* temporary restraining order an exercise in futility. The immediate and irreparable harm to Plaintiff's business and reputation, as well as to the goodwill associated with the Pomsies Mark and Pomsies Works, in denying its Application for an *ex parte* temporary restraining order greatly outweighs the harm to Defendants' interests in continuing to offer for sale and sell Counterfeit Products. *See* Ardell Dec., ¶ 29.

In order "[t]o obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish: '(1) the likelihood of irreparable injury in the absence of such an injunction, and (2) either (a) likelihood of success

⁷ Plaintiff has expressed its willingness to provide security in conjunction with the *ex parte* relief it seeks. *See* [Proposed] Order, filed herewith. Plaintiff has certified that it has not publicized this Application. *See* Ardell Dec., ¶ 29. Also, since Defendants' location and the location of the Counterfeit Products are unclear, Plaintiff is not requesting a seizure order in this Application. *See* Scully Dec., ¶¶ 22-23.

on the merits or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation plus a balance of hardships tipping decidedly' in its favor.'" *Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp.*, 426 F.3d 532, 537 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting *Federal Express Corp. v. Federal Espresso, Inc.*, 201 F.3d 168, 173 (2d Cir. 2000)). The "standards which govern consideration of an application for a temporary restraining order... are the same standards as those which govern a preliminary injunction." *Local 1814, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. N.Y. Shipping Ass'n, Inc.*, 965 F.2d 1224, 1228 (2d Cir. 1992). Plaintiff meets the standard for a preliminary injunction and the Court should enter a temporary restraining order.

1. Plaintiff Will Suffer Irreparable Harm in the Absence of an Injunction Leaving Plaintiff with No Adequate Remedy at Law

Defendants' infringing activities must be stopped immediately to prevent any further harm to Plaintiff. Not only does Plaintiff stand to suffer lost profits as a result of Defendants' competing, substandard Counterfeit Products, Defendants' illicit activities destroy the inherent value of the Pomsies Mark, impair Plaintiff's reputation, dilute Plaintiff's brands and goodwill and negatively affect Plaintiff's relationships with its current customers as well as its ability to attract new customers. See Ardell Dec., ¶ 29. While courts may no longer presume irreparable harm upon a finding of infringement, "[i]rreparable harm exists in a trademark case when the party seeking the injunction shows that it will lose control over the reputation of its trademark . . . because loss of control over one's reputation is neither 'calculable nor precisely compensable.'" *U.S. Polo Ass'n, Inc. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc.*, 800 F.Supp.2d 515, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Further, a plaintiff may still demonstrate that "on the facts of the case, the failure to issue an injunction would actually cause irreparable harm." *Salinger v. Colting*, 607 F.3d 68, 82 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing *eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC*, 547 U.S. 388, 393).

This Circuit recognizes that irreparable harm sufficient to warrant a preliminary injunction

exists where defendant injected counterfeit versions of a plaintiff's products into the market. *See CJ Prods. LLC v. Snuggly Plushez LLC*, 809 F. Supp. 2d 127, 145 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). Here, Defendants have sold substandard Counterfeit Products that look remarkably similar, if not identical, to the Pomsies Products and which embody, bear and/or incorporate the Pomsies Mark and/or Pomsies Works and/or identical or confusingly and/or substantially similar marks and/or works, thereby resulting in lost sales and impairing Plaintiff's reputation that it has achieved through the expenditure of considerable time and effort. *See Mitchell Grp. USA LLC v. Udeh*, No. 14-cv-5745, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18801 at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2015) (internal citations omitted); Ardell Dec., ¶ 29 and Scully Dec., ¶¶ 15-18.

Moreover, Defendants' counterfeiting and infringing activities deny Plaintiff of its fundamental right to control the quality of the goods sold under the Pomsies Marks. *See Zino Davidoff SA v. CVS Corp.*, 571 F.3d 238, 243 (2d Cir. 2009). Defendants are offering their substandard Counterfeit Products in wholesale quantities and at significantly below-market prices with which Plaintiff cannot compete given the high-quality materials and construction necessary to manufacture the Pomsies Products. *See* Ardell Dec., ¶ 24 and Scully Dec., ¶¶ 20-21; *see also Zino Davidoff SA*, 71 F.3d 244

Also, because Defendants' substandard Counterfeit Products are virtually indistinguishable from the Pomsies Products, not only could any injury to consumers that results from use of Defendants' substandard Counterfeit Products be attributed to Plaintiff, thereby causing irreparable harm to Plaintiff in the form of unquantifiable lost sales, loss of goodwill and loss of control of its reputation with authorized licensees, retailers and consumers, but Plaintiff would also potentially be exposed to legal liability for any such injury to consumers, which is especially important given . *See* Ardell Dec., ¶ 29 and Scully Dec., ¶¶ 17, 20-21. Thus, this factor weighs

heavily in Plaintiff's favor.

2. Plaintiff is Likely to Prevail on the Merits of Its Lanham Act Claims

In order to establish a likelihood of success on trademark counterfeiting and infringement claims, a plaintiff must show: (1) that its marks are valid and entitled to protection, and (2) that defendants' use of plaintiff's marks is likely to cause confusion. *See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc.*, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).

First, the U.S. Trademark Registration certificate submitted in conjunction with this Application provides *prima facie* evidence of both the validity of the Pomsies Mark as well as Plaintiff's ownership of the same. *See* Ardell Dec., ¶ 9, Ex. B; 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b).

Second, a proper likelihood of confusion inquiry generally involves an analysis of the factors set forth in *Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp.* 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). Yet, "where counterfeit marks are involved, it is not necessary to conduct the step-by-step examination of each *Polaroid* factor because counterfeit marks are inherently confusing." *Fendi Adele S.R.L. v. Filene's Basement, Inc.*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 368, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal citations omitted). Instead, "[t]he court need only determine the more fundamental question of whether there are items to be confused in the first place -- that is, whether the items at issue . . . are, in fact, counterfeit and whether [d]efendants sold those items, or offered those items for sale." *Id.* at 383 (internal citations omitted). Regardless, even if a *Polaroid* analysis were necessary, a straightforward application of the test clearly demonstrates that a likelihood of confusion exists.

Finally, because Plaintiff has shown that it is likely to prevail on its trademark counterfeiting and trademark infringement claims, it has also shown that it likely will prevail on its claims for false designation of origin, passing off and unfair competition. *See Richemont N. Am., Inc. v. Linda Lin Huang*, No. 12 Civ. 4443 (KBF), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136790, at *14-16 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 24, 2013).

a) *The Pomsies Mark is Strong and Distinctive*

In determining the strength of a mark, courts look to: “(1) inherent strength, resulting from the mark's degree of inherent distinctiveness, usually measured on the ladder ranging from unprotectable generic marks to arbitrary, fanciful marks that enjoy the broadest protection, and (2) acquired strength, reflecting the degree of consumer recognition the mark has achieved.” *Tcpip Holding Co. v. Haar Communs. Inc.*, 244 F.3d 88, 100 (2d Cir. 2001). The Pomsies Marks is suggestive as applied to the goods with which it is associated, and has acquired distinctiveness from being prominently used in connection with the Pomsies Products, which have achieved worldwide recognition and fame. *See* Ardell Dec., ¶¶ 9, 13, Ex. A. Additionally, the federal trademark registration for the Pomsies Mark further demonstrate the strength of the same. *See id.*; *see also Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co.*, 799 F.2d 867, 871 (2d Cir. 1986). Likewise, the Pomsies Mark is suggestive as applied to the goods with which it is associated, as it “require[s] imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of the goods,” and thus, the Pomsies Mark is inherently distinctive and is thereby entitled to trademark protection “without proof of secondary meaning.” *Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc.*, 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Thus, this factor weighs in Plaintiff’s favor.

b) *Defendants’ Counterfeit Products and Marks are Virtually Identical to the Pomsies Products and Pomsies Marks*

Defendants have applied identical copies of the Pomsies Mark to their substandard, Counterfeit Products and/or used identical copies of the Pomsies Mark in marketing and promoting their substandard, Counterfeit Products on Defendants’ User Accounts and Merchant Storefronts; as such, this factor weighs in favor of Plaintiff. *See* Arnaiz Dec., ¶¶ 6-7, Ex. A; Ardell Dec., ¶¶ 21-22 and Scully Dec., ¶¶ 15-17. Defendants’ Counterfeit Products are clearly designed to look as much like the Pomsies Products as possible, without the quality and workmanship. *See* Ardell

Dec., ¶¶ 22, 24-25; Scully Dec., ¶¶ 15, 17; *see also Rado Watch Co. v. ABC, Co.*, No. 92 Civ. 3657 (PKL), 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8356, *11 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). Minor differences exist between the Counterfeit Products and the Pomsies Products, which have no bearing on a finding of likelihood of confusion. *See* Arnaiz Dec., ¶¶ 6-7, Ex. A; Ardell Dec., ¶ 22 and Scully Dec., ¶¶ 15, 17.; *see also Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp.*, 111 F.3d 993, 1004-1005 (2d Cir. 1997). Courts do “not look with much favor on the businessman who, out of the wealth of words available, chooses as a trademark one which comes as close as he dares to a well-known mark on the identical product.” *A. T. Cross Co. v. Jonathan Bradley Pens, Inc.*, 470 F.2d 689, 692 (2d Cir. 1972).

c) Defendants’ Counterfeit Products Directly Compete with the Pomsies Products and There is No Gap to Bridge

In considering the proximity of the products in the market, the concern is “competitive proximity,” meaning “whether and to what extent the two products compete with each other.” *Cadbury Beverages Inc. v. Cott Corp.*, 73 F.3d 474, 480 (2d Cir. 1996). In assessing the proximity of the parties’ products, courts “look to the nature of the products themselves and the structure of the relevant market. Among the considerations germane to the structure of the market are the class of customers to whom the goods are sold, the manner in which the products are advertised, and the channels through which the goods are sold.” *Id.* (citations and internal quotations omitted). “[T]he closer the secondary user’s goods are to those the consumer has seen marketed under the prior user’s band, the more likely that the consumer will mistakenly assume a common source.” *Virgin Enterprises v. Nawab*, 335 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir. 2003). In this case, the class of customers for both the Counterfeit Products and the Pomsies Products are the same retail consumers, so this factor weighs in favor of Plaintiff.

Further, where, as here, Defendants are offering for sale and selling products that are virtually identical in kind, but not in quality to the Pomsies Products, bearing counterfeit and/or

infringing marks in the same class of goods under which Plaintiff sells its Pomsies Products, they are already in competitive proximity and there is no “gap” to bridge. *See* Arnaiz Dec., ¶¶ 6-7, Ex. A; Ardell Dec., ¶ 22 and Scully Dec., ¶¶ 15, 17; *see also Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc.*, 588 F.3d 97, 115 (2d Cir. 2009).

d) *Actual Confusion Can Be Inferred Between Defendants’ Counterfeit Products and the Pomsies Products*

Seeing as Defendants are offering for sale and/or selling counterfeit versions of the Pomsies Products under the Pomsies Mark, or a confusingly similar mark, actual confusion can be inferred. *See* Arnaiz Dec., ¶¶ 6-7, Ex. A; Ardell Dec., ¶ 22 and Scully Dec., ¶¶ 15, 17. Plaintiff, however, does not need to prove actual confusion, only a likelihood of confusion to obtain equitable relief. *See Prot. One Alarm Monitoring, Inc. v. Exec. Prot. One Sec. Serv., LLC*, 553 F. Supp. 2d 201, 206 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).

e) *Defendants Acted in Bad Faith*

Given that Defendants’ choice of marks, which are virtually identical to the Pomsies Mark and used in connection with the offering for sale and/or sale of virtually identical products, it can be presumed that Defendants intended to trade off of the goodwill and reputation of Plaintiff, its Pomsies Products and Pomsies Mark. *See* Arnaiz Dec., ¶ 6, Ex. A; Ardell Dec., ¶ 29 and Scully Dec., ¶ 17-18, Ex. A.; *see also Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Allied Old English, Inc.*, 831 F. Supp. 123, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). If Defendants’ counterfeiting and infringing actions are found to be willful, “likelihood of confusion will be presumed as a matter of law.” *N.Y. State Soc’y of CPA’s v. Eric Louis Assocs.*, 79 F. Supp. 2d 331, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).

f) *Defendants’ Counterfeit Products Are of Inferior Quality*

The Pomsies Products are manufactured with high quality materials. *See* Ardell Dec., ¶ 24. Plaintiff has neither authorized Defendants’ use of the Pomsies Mark or confusingly similar

marks in connection with the Counterfeit Products, nor approved or tested Defendants' Counterfeit Products being offered for sale and/or sold under or in connection with the Pomsies Mark and/or confusingly similar marks. *See* Ardell Dec., ¶ 23. Hence, Defendants have encroached on Plaintiff's right to control the quality of the goods manufactured and sold under its Pomsies Mark. *See Polymer Technology Corp. v. Mimran*, 975 F.2d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 1992). This supports a finding of likelihood of confusion.

g) *The Sophistication of Purchasers*

"Where the purchasers of a products are highly trained professionals, they know the market and are less likely than untrained consumers to be misled or confused by the similarity of different marks." *Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab*, 335 F.3d 141, 151 (2d Cir. 2003). In contrast, ordinary "retail customers," "are not expected to exercise the same degree of care as professional buyers, who are expected to have greater powers of discrimination." *Pretty Girl, Inc. v. Pretty Girl Fashions, Inc.*, 778 F. Supp. 2d 261, 268-269 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (internal citations omitted). This factor favors Plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits.

3. Plaintiff is Likely to Prevail on Its Copyright Act Claims

Under 17 U.S.C. § 501(a), in order to show likelihood of success on the merits for a copyright infringement claim, a given plaintiff must demonstrate: "(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original." *Kwan v. Schlein*, 634 F.3d 224, 229 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting *Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co.*, 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)). Defendants have infringed upon the Pomsies Works.

a) *Plaintiff owns Valid Copyrights in the Pomsies Works*

With respect to ownership, "[a] certificate of registration from the United States Register of Copyrights constitutes prima facie evidence of the valid ownership of a copyright." *Mint, Inc.*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49813, at *6; *see also* 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). Thus, Plaintiff's certificates of

registration for the Pomsies Works are *prima facie* evidence of the validity of the copyrights and the facts stated in such registrations. *See* Ardell Dec., ¶ 12, Ex. C.

b) Defendants Infringed the Pomsies Works

To establish infringement, “the copyright owner must demonstrate that: (1) the defendant has actually copied the plaintiff’s work; and (2) the copying is illegal because a substantial similarity exists between the defendant’s work and the protectible [sic] elements of plaintiff’s [work].” *Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ Inc.*, 262 F.3d 101, 110 (2d Cir. 2001).

A plaintiff may demonstrate actual copying “either by direct or indirect evidence.” *P&G v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.*, 199 F.3d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted). “Indirect copying may be shown by demonstrating that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and that the similarities between the works are probative of copying.” *Id.* “Generally, an allegedly infringing work is considered substantially similar to a copyrighted work if the ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same.” *Mint, Inc.*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49813, at *7 n.16 (quoting *Boisson v. Banian, Ltd.*, 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001)). Here, a representative sample of side-by-side comparisons of the Pomsies Works to Defendants’ Infringing Products and/or Defendants’ Infringing Listings illustrates that Defendants are copying the Pomsies Works by reproducing and/or displaying substantially similar, if not identical, imitations of the Pomsies Works embodied in the Infringing Products themselves and/or in connection with the offering for sale and/or sale of Infringing Products. *See* Arnaiz Dec., ¶¶ 6-7, Ex. A; Ardell Dec., ¶ 22 and Scully Dec., ¶¶ 16-18, Ex. A. Defendants have taken the original and well-known elements of the Pomsies Works and have used the same and/or elements thereof in Defendants’ Infringing Listings for their Infringing Products. *See* Scully Dec., ¶¶ 16-18, Ex. A. Additionally, Defendants’ imitations of the Pomsies Works are virtually indistinguishable therefrom, and with Plaintiff’s significant and widespread

advertising efforts, shows that Defendants unquestionably had “access” to the Pomsies Works. *See id.*; *see also Mint, Inc.*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49813, at *7. The evidence properly before the Court demonstrates that Defendants had, at a minimum, “a reasonable possibility of access” to the Pomsies Products. *Gaste v. Kaiserman*, 863 F.2d 1061, 1066 (2d Cir. 1988).

Moreover, Defendants’ infringing use of the Pomsies Works is clearly also more than *de minimis*. Nevertheless, Defendants have taken entire and/or core elements of the Pomsies Works and have used these, or nearly identical replicas thereof, in connection with the advertising, marketing, distributing, offering for sale, and/or sale of the Infringing Products. Defendants have directly copied one or more of the individual components of the Pomsies Works and have used such elements together in the Infringing Listings. *See* Scully Dec., ¶¶ 16-18, Ex. A and Arnaiz Dec., Ex. A. Thus, Plaintiff has established substantial similarity between the Pomsies Works and Defendants’ imitations, and that Defendants copied the same. *See Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc.*, 338 F.3d 127, 131 (2d Cir. 2003). Accordingly, Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of its copyright claims.

4. Plaintiff is Likely to Prevail on Its State Law Claims

Because Plaintiff has shown a likelihood of success on its Lanham Act claims, Plaintiff has also shown a likelihood of success on its deceptive trade practices, false advertising, unfair competition and unjust enrichment claims under New York State law. *See N. Am. Olive Oil Ass’n v. Kangadis Food Inc.*, 962 F. Supp. 2d 514, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

5. The Balance of Hardships Favors Plaintiff

The balance of hardships unquestionably and overwhelmingly favors Plaintiff. Plaintiff has suffered, and will continue to suffer, irreparable harm to its business, the value, goodwill and reputation built up in and associated with the Pomsies Mark and Pomsies Works and to its

reputation as a result of Defendants' willful and knowing sales of substandard imitations of the Pomsies Products. *See* Ardell Dec., ¶ 29. In contrast, any harm to Defendants would only be the loss of Defendants' ability to continue to offer their Counterfeit Products for sale, or, in other words, the loss of the benefit of being allowed to continue to unfairly profit from their illegal and infringing activities. "Indeed, to the extent defendants 'elect[] to build a business on products found to infringe[,] [they] cannot be heard to complain if an injunction against continuing infringement destroys the business so elected.'" *Broad. Music, Inc. v. Prana Hosp., Inc.*, 158 F. Supp. 3d 184, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (internal citation omitted).

6. Enjoining Defendants from Using the Pomsies Marks and Pomsies Works Will Serve the Public Interest

The public interest will be served by the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, as "the public has an interest in not being deceived—in being assured that the mark it associates with a product is not attached to goods of unknown origin and quality." *N.Y.C. Triathlon, LLC v. NYC Triathlon Club, Inc.*, 704 F. Supp. 2d 305, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Here, the public has an interest in being able to rely on the high quality of the Pomsies Products bearing and/or sold in connection with the Pomsies Mark and Pomsies Works. Since Defendants have willfully and knowingly inserted substandard Counterfeit Products into the marketplace, the public would benefit from a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction halting any further sale and distribution of Defendants' Counterfeit Products. *See* Arnaiz Dec., ¶¶ 6-7, Ex. A and Scully Dec., ¶¶ 15-17.

C. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN ORDER PREVENTING 1) THE FRAUDULENT TRANSFER OF ASSETS AND 2) FREEZING DEFENDANTS' MERCHANT STOREFRONTS

1. Defendants' Assets Must be Frozen

Given Defendants' counterfeiting businesses, and Plaintiff's showing that it has a high likelihood of succeeding on the merits of all of its claims, Plaintiff will be entitled to an equitable accounting of Defendants' profits from their sales of Counterfeit Products. Accordingly, Plaintiff's request for an asset freeze order granting Plaintiff information regarding the location of Defendants' Assets, the attachment of Defendants' Assets and an injunction preventing the transfer from or to Defendants' Financial Accounts by the Financial Institutions and Third Party Service Providers is both necessary and appropriate, and is within this Court's discretion to preserve Plaintiff's right to the relief sought in the Complaint. *See* 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).⁸

District courts have the "authority to freeze those assets which could [be] used to satisfy an equitable award of profits." *North Face Apparel Corp. v. TC Fashions, Inc.*, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14226, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2006) (internal citation omitted). A court "may exempt any particular assets from the freeze on the ground that they [are] not linked to the profits of allegedly illegal activity." *Id.* at *11. The onus is on "the party seeking relief [from any such asset freeze] to 'present documentary proof'" that its profits do not stem from such illegal activity. *Id.*

Under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) and 17 U.S.C. § 504(b), a plaintiff in an action arising thereunder is entitled to recover a defendant's profits derived from the counterfeiting and/or infringement and/or plaintiff's damages. *See Gucci Am. v. Bank of China*, 768 F.3d 122, 131-132 (2d Cir. 2014) (A copyright and/or trademark "infringer is required in equity to account for and yield up his gains to the true owner," and "profits are then allowed as an equitable measure of compensation."). With respect to claims involving the infringement of federally registered copyrighted works and/or those arising under the Lanham Act, district courts have the authority to

⁸ *See also, e.g., Balenciaga Am., Inc. v. Dollinger*, No. 10 Civ. 2912 (LTS), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107733, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2010).

issue a prejudgment asset restraint injunction in favor of plaintiffs seeking an accounting, and/or another equitable remedy, against allegedly infringing defendants. *See Warner Bros. Entm't Inc. v. Doe*, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190098 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2014).

An asset freeze in the instant matter is unquestionably warranted because Defendants, who are foreign individuals and/or entities based in China, are manufacturing, importing, exporting, advertising, marketing, promoting, distributing, displaying, offering for sale and/or selling Counterfeit Products to U.S. consumers solely via the Internet, and accepting payment for such Counterfeit Products in U.S. Dollars through Financial Institutions, thereby causing irreparable harm to Plaintiff in the form of lost sales, loss of goodwill and loss of control of their reputation with licensees, retailers and consumers, and can, and most certainly have the incentive to, transfer and hide their ill-gotten funds if their assets are not frozen. *See Arnaiz Dec.*, ¶¶ 6-18, Ex. A; *Ardell Dec.*, ¶ 29; *see also Dama S.P.A. v. Doe*, No. 15-cv-4528 (VM), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178076, at *4-6 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2015).⁹ Therefore, Plaintiff respectfully submits that this Court should exercise its inherent equitable power and freeze Defendants' Assets and Defendants' Financial Accounts for the purpose of preserving Defendants' funds and ensuring that a meaningful accounting of their profits can be made.¹⁰

2. Defendants' User Accounts and Merchant Storefronts Must be Frozen

A temporary restraining order which, in part, restrains the Third Party Service Providers from providing services to Defendants' User Accounts and Merchant Storefronts is warranted and necessary because the continued offering for sale and/or sale of the Counterfeit Products by Defendants on their Merchant Storefronts will result in immediate and irreparable injury to

⁹ *See also* Footnote 1.

¹⁰ Upon the entering of an asset freeze, Plaintiff also requests that the Court Order Defendants and/or the Financial Institutions and/or the Third Party Service Providers to immediately identify Defendants' Assets and Defendants' Financial Accounts and the respective current account or fund balances of the same.

Plaintiff. *See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li*, 768 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2014) and *AW Licensing, LLC v. Bao*, No. 15-CV-1373, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177101, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2015).

D. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN ORDER AUTHORIZING ALTERNATIVE SERVICE OF PROCESS BY ELECTRONIC MEANS

Fed. R. Civ. P. (4) governs service on Defendants in the instant matter since, upon information and belief, they are located in China. While Defendants operate sophisticated commercial businesses, they are limited to correspondence by email, messaging through their respective User Accounts and communications otherwise transmitted over the Internet. *See Arnaiz Dec.*, ¶¶ 6-18, Ex. A. Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court issue an order granting it permission to serve each respective Defendant via the following combination of methods: 1) registered electronic mail, 2) messaging through Defendants' User Accounts and 3) website publication.

Plaintiff may serve international defendants pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3), which enables a court to grant an alternative method of service so long as it: "(1) is not prohibited by international agreement; and (2) comports with constitutional notions of due process." *SEC v. Anticevic*, No. 05 CV 6991 (KMW), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11480, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2009). Notably, "[s]ervice under subsection [4(f)] (3) is neither a last resort nor extraordinary relief. It is merely one means among several which enables service of process on an international defendant." *Sulzer Mixpac AG*, 312 F.R.D. 329, 330. Since third-party merchants on Alibaba.com, AliExpress.com or DHgate.com, like Defendants, have been known to use aliases, false addresses and other incomplete identification information to shield their true identities and there are, in fact, only partial, incomplete or no physical addresses whatsoever associated with the majority of Defendants' User Accounts, this is exactly the circumstance where the courts should exercise, as

they previously have,¹¹ the authority to grant alternative methods of service. *See id.* “The decision whether to allow alternative methods of serving process under Rule 4(f)(3) is committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” *Id.*¹²

In the instant matter, Plaintiff proposes using Outlook.com as well as RPost (www.rpost.com), an online service that confirms valid proof of authorship, content, and delivery of an email, as well as the official time and date that the email was sent and received. *See* Scully Dec., ¶ 24. Along with service via email and messaging on Defendants’ User Accounts, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court, in its discretion, permit service via website publication.¹³

Ultimately, service on Defendants by various electronic means comports with due process, as it is “reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” *Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.*, 339 U.S. 306, 309. The majority of Defendants have not disclosed their mailing addresses, and even of those Defendants that have disclosed mailing addresses, such addresses are likely incomplete and/or false. *See* Scully Dec., ¶¶ 22-23. Due to Defendants’ purposeful anonymity, service by email, with confirmation of delivery by RPost, messaging through Defendants’ User Accounts and website publication is most likely to provide Defendants with proper notice of this action and Plaintiff’s claims. *See Dama S.P.A.*, 2015 U.S.

¹¹ *See Dama S.P.A.*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178076, at *6-7; *AW Licensing, LLC*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177101, at *18-19; *FTC v. PCCare247 Inc.*, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31969, at *20.

¹² Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P (4)(1), service may be effected “by any internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably calculated to give notice, such as those authorized by The Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents” (“Hague Convention”). Although China is a signatory to the Hauge Convention, it “shall not apply where the address of the person to be served with the document is not known.” *See* Hague Convention, November 15, 1965, Article 1. Despite China’s objection to service by postal channels under Article 10, this Court has held that such objection does not include service by email and further, that service by email is not prohibited by any international agreement. *See Sulzer Mixpac AG v. Medenstar Indus. Co.*, 312 F.R.D. 329, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).

¹³ Publication on a website has been deemed appropriate service under Fed. R. Civ. P (4)(3) “so long as the proposed publication is ‘reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’” *National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. v. Does*, 584 F. Supp. 2d 824, 826 W.D.N.C. 2008) (quoting *Mullane*, 339 U.S. at 315-16).

Dist. LEXIS 178076, at *7. Plaintiff respectfully submits that an order authorizing alternative service will benefit all parties and the Court by ensuring that Defendants receive immediate notice of the pendency of this action and allowing this action to move forward expeditiously.¹⁴

E. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN ORDER AUTHORIZING EXPEDITED DISCOVERY

Additionally, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court order expedited discovery from Defendants, Financial Institutions and Third Party Service Providers regarding the scope and extent of Defendants' counterfeiting and infringing activities, as well as Defendants' account details and other information relating to Defendants' Financial Accounts, Assets and/or any and all User Accounts and or Financial Accounts with the Third Party Service Providers, including, without limitation any and all websites, any and all User Accounts and any and all Merchant Storefronts, including, without limitation, those owned and operated, directly or indirectly, by the Third Party Service Providers and the Financial Institutions.

Generally, a party may not seek discovery prior to a Rule 26(f) conference unless authorized by a court order. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). In the past, Courts in this District have often applied a four-factor test to determine when expedited discovery may be granted,¹⁵ but now apply a more flexible "good cause" test to examine "the discovery request . . . on the entirety of the record to date and the *reasonableness* of the request in light of all the surrounding circumstances." *Ayyash v. Bank Al-Madina*, 233 F.R.D. 325, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (internal citation omitted). Regardless, Plaintiff has established that it is entitled to the expedited discovery requested for good cause shown. *See id.* at 327; *see also* Ardell Dec., ¶ 29 and Scully Dec., ¶¶ 11-13, 22-23.

¹⁴ Plaintiff also respectfully submits that the Court issue an order authorizing Plaintiff to serve the Financial Institutions and/or Third Party Service Providers with notice of the Court's order of the Application via electronic means prior to serving Defendants and with enough time for the Financial Institutions and/or Third Party Service Providers to comply with the Court's order to help expedite the process.

¹⁵ *See Advanced Portfolio Techs., Inc. v. Advanced Portfolio Techs., Ltd.*, No. 94 Civ. 5620 (JFK), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18457, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 1994).

F. PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR A SECURITY BOND IN THE AMOUNT OF \$5,000 IS ADEQUATE

In determining the amount of the bond that a moving party must post, this Court is “vested with wide discretion.” *Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Stuart*, 85 F.3d 975, 985 (2d Cir. 1996). Plaintiff respectfully submits the provision of security in the amount of \$5,000 is sufficient. *See Rovio Entertainment Ltd. and Rovio Animation OY v. Best Baby and Kid Store, et al.*, No. 17-cv-4884-KPF, Dkt. 3 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2017).¹⁶

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff respectfully requests that its Application be granted *ex parte* in its entirety.

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Respectfully submitted,

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¹⁶ Moreover, this Court has gone as far as to hold that no security bond is necessary in similar circumstances. *See Ontel Products Corp. v. Airbrushpainting Makeup Store a/k/a Airbrushespainting, et al.*, No. 17-cv-871 (KBF), Dkt. 20 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2017).